ABSTRACT The vehicle to everything (V2X) requires the real-time integration of all kinds of information on roads, pedestrians, the environment, and vehicles themselves. This information also needs to be shared with other vehicles. The effective integration of information and the strong privacy protection are the key restrictions on the development of the V2X. The previous privacy protection model has mainly focused on the centralized network, and there were problems with the centralized gateway and single-point decision, which were not suitable for the decentralized scenario. Therefore, this paper proposes a remote attestation security model based on a privacy-preserving blockchain. The overall model involves two core steps. First, the vehicle provides the network with an evidence of a credible identity and integrity. Secured, the vehicles in the network calculate the nodes to make their respective decisions, and the accounting nodes summarize the sub-conclusions, form the final results, and write them into data blocks. The analysis shows that it possesses the security features of decentralization, traceability, anonymity, irreplaceability, and high efficiency. The model framework, core block chain structure, and protocol process are described in detail. The experimental results based on a realistic infrastructure are presented. These experimental results demonstrate that our scheme can effectively enhance the security of the communications of intelligent vehicles in the V2X. Blockchain, remote attestation, vehicular communication, V2X, 
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart city is the advanced product of urban development. Its core idea is to realize the interconnection, dynamic perception and smart management of various objects in the city. It provides a new direction for future cities. The Internet of Vehicles (IOV) is the core area of intelligent transportation. Based on the Intranet, vehicular networks and the mobile Internet, information exchanges between vehicles and vehicles, vehicles and buildings, and vehicles and infrastructure units are realized [1] .
The IOV requires the real-time integration of all kinds of information about the road, pedestrians, the environment and the vehicles themselves, and the information also needs to be sharable among vehicles. Therefore, the effective integration of information and strong privacy protections are the key restrictions on the development of the current IOV. The blockchain was first applied to finance as the underlying technology of bitcoin, which is essentially a distributed database [2] . In this distributed network structure, the distributed consensus algorithm is used to complete the network and the encryption algorithm is used to ensure effective pointto-point transmissions. A distributed consensus algorithm can guarantee that the network is able to conduct effective self-maintenance, information fusion, and the encryption algorithm to guarantee the security of point-to-point transmissions. The workings of blockchain technology have many similarities with the vehicular network [3] . The peerto-peer network and the vehicular network served by the blockchain have the features of multiple nodes, the frequent joining and disjoining of nodes, and communications via broadcasts between nodes. Therefore, it is important to make use of the good encryption performance and self-maintenance ability of blockchain technology. It is necessary to analyse the application scenarios of the blockchain to vehicle networks in order to improve the signal quality of hot spots in the vehicle network and reduce the costs of building and maintaining the vehicle network infrastructure [4] .
Recently, trusted computing has become the key to enhancing computer systems' security-related technology. Its core is based on the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which builds trust from the bottom to the application and extends it to the network chain. Remote attestation is one of the important functions of trusted computing [5] . The TPM must prove itself credible to an external entity. Compared with traditional identity authentication, remote attestation further extends the content of the certification and allows both sides of the validation to have a deeper, more detailed certification [6] .
For the vehicular network, it is particularly important to calculate the verifiable and perceptible security trust between nodes. However, the current remote attestation model is aimed at the central network, and there are defects in the gateway centralization and monolingual decisions in practical application scenarios [7] . In the central network, whether it is a virtual network or physical network, the gateway is based on a certain access strategy. It then controls the communications between the network computing nodes and between the network computing nodes and the external nodes. Both virtual gateway and actual gateway devices inevitably have some security vulnerabilities. Thus, it can be seen that the traditional remote attestation model cannot meet the requirements of remote attestation in a decentralized distributed network. To solve this problem, this paper innovatively applies blockchain technology to remote attestation. It combines the features of decentralization, non-repudiation, protection and anonymity of the blockchain with the credibility and security of remote attestation.
In this paper, we propose a remote attestation security model based on a privacy-preserving blockchain. This proposed model is called the RASM. The main contributions of this paper are three-fold as follows.
1) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to investigate the basic architecture of the remote attestation model, the construction of the privacy protection blockchain and the threat model.
2) A remote attestation security model based on a privacypreserving blockchain involves two core steps. The first is credible identity authentication. The second is using calculation nodes to make decisions and accounting nodes to write the data blocks.
3) The security model is evaluated using a real V2X scenario. The RASM satisfies the security requirements of being decentralized, traceable, anonymous and non-repudiatable and has good performance.
The experimental results show that the RASM can effectively enhance the security performance of the V2X.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the related work. Section III introduces the network architecture and security goals. Section IV details the remote attestation security model. Section V shows the security evaluation. Section VI analyses the performance of the RASM through extensive experiments. Section VII concludes the paper with a summary.
II. RELATED WORK
This section discusses the existing, related work on the remote attestation model, the construction of the privacy protection blockchain and the authentication model.
A. REMOTE ATTESTATION IN V2X
Remote attestation is a process whereby a trusted computing platform proves to an external entity that it has a legitimate TPM. It provides evidence that it is operating credibly [8] . At this point, in the security model of trusted computing, external entities believe that the platform is credible and can conduct secure interactions. To achieve this goal, researchers have done a lot of research work by mainly focusing on two levels.
1) Identity Attestation. The platform for authentication on a trusted platform determines whether the other party has legal TPM Endorsement Key (EK). Its core problem is that both have to prove their identities to each other.
2) Platform Integrity Attestation. It is mainly divided into two methods: binary-based and attribute-based. Binary attestation is the most basic method. The platform integrity information is sent to the verifier for verification, but the privacy content such as the platform configuration is exposed. Attribute based verification extracts the security attributes of the trusted platform. By mapping the platform's integrity information and security attributes, it can prove itself credible without exposing the platform's specific information, but it requires the intervention of a third party [9] .
In our study, we are mainly facing with two scenarios of remote attestation. First, when a new node is added to the network, whether the node can be added to the network is judged. Second, when two nodes in the network communicate, fast remote verification is performed between nodes.
B. PRIVACY-PRESERVING BLOCKCHAIN
The blockchain is a distributed ledger that records the history of sending and verifying each transaction, and the additional information contained in the transaction [3] , [6] . All the blocks in the blockchain are sorted chronologically, created and added by miners, and each node has a backup of blockchain information. Blockchain technology, due to its characteristics of decentralization, permanent records and auditing ease, can be used to meet data security requirements such as the integrity, restriction and auditability of privacy data, which makes it an effective solution for privacy protection [10] .
There is not much literature on blockchain technology in privacy protection. In the blockchain technical application areas for privacy protection problems, literature [11] referred to communications that have not been well addressed in previous reports. It uses the Cuckoo filter and binary search methods to achieve higher a success rate. Reference [12] proposes that a blockchain can provide a mechanism to protect private health data from infringement, but the details of the application scenario and implementation of the blockchain for personal privacy protection are not given. In the use of a blockchain to solve practical problems, previous research [13] has suggested that the scheme can be used in the system to transfer instructions such as storage, inquiries and data analysis. It ensures that users have and control their own information. However, it does not propose a specific case application, nor does it elaborate on the issue of individual privacy. Additional research [14] has noted that the blockchain transaction environment lacks transactional privacy protection, and the money flows between virtual addresses are completely exposed to the blockchain environment. Therefore, a decentralized intelligent contract system called Hawk is proposed to protect the privacy of transactions by not storing financial transactions in clear text on the blockchain. Hawk can only guarantee the privacy of transaction information, and it lacks a wider range of applications in real life. In [15] researchers detailed how to use a blockchain to protect privacy by proposing an effective announcement network called CreditCoin. The scheme allows nondeterministic different signers to generate the signatures and to send announcements anonymously in the non-fully trusted environment. It is able to motivate users to forward announcements anonymously and reliably. However, it needs improvements in its key management and coin balancing.
Therefore, it is necessary to study the application of the blockchain to the privacy protection of the V2X. In the V2X scenario, the application details of the blockchain privacy protection mechanism are explained one by one, which is useful for further research on privacy protection issues.
C. CERTIFICATION AND THREAT MODELS
The V2X is an important part of the necessary technology and intelligent traffic for autonomous driving, where X represents the infrastructure, vehicles, pedestrians, roads, etc. At present, the two major camps of V2X technology are Long Term Evolution-Vehicle (LTE-V) technology and Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) technology [16] . Vehicles that are part of vehicular networks are equipped with on-board units (OBUs). Each vehicle can communicate with nearby vehicles and roadside units (RSU) through the Internet.
Existing vehicular networking communications still have a lot of security problems, such as replay attacks, redirection attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks [17] . These attacks counterfeit nodes that can control the vehicle by forging the vehicle identification and can send false information. In addition, they can forge the traffic scene to affect the normal judgement of the vehicle, thereby resulting in the breakdown of the vehicular network or traffic accidents [18] .
The threat model relies on a Certificate Authority (CA), which generates the signature values of public-private keys and direct anonymous attestation but does not participate in the decision-making. The TPM is reliable and can accurately report platform information. The nodes in the network are trusted when they join the network [19] . Encryption can be used to secure communication channels. It uses the abstract consensus mechanism rather than the concrete realization consensus method. When it abstracts the smart contract, it describes its functions but does not implement the smart contract. It is assumed that the application software in the computer system is not trusted. In the process of network operations, the number of trusted nodes meets the theoretical requirement of the public mechanism [20] . In the process of network operations, the number of trusted nodes meets the theoretical requirement of the public mechanism [21] .
The identity authentication scheme can effectively solve the storage and management problems. In [22] , an authentication scheme for vehicular ad hoc networks was proposed based on the elliptical curve signature. The scheme could solve the non-repudiation problem of simple batch messages. Later research [23] found that [22] 's plan was unable to withstand a fake attack. To overcome these shortcomings, they proposed an improved certification scheme for the group testing of secure mass verification. In [24] a security authentication scheme with batch validation was proposed. However, bilinear pairings are one of the most complex operations in modern cryptography. To improve the performance and reduce the computational complexity of information processing, literature [25] proposed a solution that does not use bilinear pairings. In addition, [26] aimed to improve the security functionality of vehicular LTE-V networks. It proposed an efficient and secure ID-based message authentication scheme for vehicular networks.
Currently, there is no solution for the centralized network. In addition, there are problems with the centralized gateway and single point decision in the V2X. Therefore, this study studies the remote attestation security model based on a privacy-preserving blockchain for the V2X.
III. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE AND BLOCKCHAIN MODEL
In this section, the network architecture and blockchain model is presented. The security goal of the RASM is also defined.
A. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
In a central network, whether virtual or physical, the gateway is based on a certain access strategy. It needs to control the communication between the network computing nodes and between the network computing nodes and the external nodes. However, the access policy is generated by a dedicated server, and the process that generates the policy is remote attestation. The remote attestation security model based on the privacy-preserving blockchain is shown in Figure 1 .
As shown in Figure 1 , in the RASM scheme, we define each part of the model separately.
TN: Trusted Node. It is an actual secure node in a distributed network with a legitimate TPM. NTN: Non-Trusted Node. It is an actual node in a distributed network that may have security risks that are not necessarily malicious nodes with a legal TPM.
MN: Malicious Node. It is a malicious node through which the external network tries to enter the network.
AN: Accounting Node. It is selected according to the consensus algorithm of the accounting nodes, and it has a large probability of being a TN.
P2P: Peer to Peer. It is the foundation of the distributed underlying network. It is the basic channel through which each computing node communicates with each other, and the communication security is guaranteed by the password function of the TPM.
A-BC: Attestation Block Chain. It is a distributed blockchain system used to store the security and connection state of computing nodes and provide evidence for remote verification. It is expressed as B 1 →B 2 → . . . →B n .
CA: Certificate Authority. It is recorded for the TPM of the computing node and assists in some functions, but it does not participate in any decision making in order to maximize decentralization.
B. SECURITY GOALS
The remote attestation model RASM based on the blockchain aims to achieve five target security goals. It should inherit the security features of the blockchain and guarantee the security requirements of remote verification [27] .
1) DECENTRALIZATION
Decentralization is reflected in two aspects. The first is the central gateway. The blockchain system actually stores the decision list of the access control in the traditional security gateway in the same way as the distributed data in every computing node to spread the security risk and reduce the possibility of the whole network being breached. The second is the co-decision.
2) TRACEABILITY AND ANONYMITY
If a participant or multi-party participant leaks a long-used private key, the previously generated Shared key is not affected [28] . Since the Shared key is generated by the parties involved, no one can control the selected value of the shared key in the negotiations. The scheme needs to be traceable and anonymous.
3) NON-REPUDIATION
The RASM must be non-repudiatable. It is an important security feature of the blockchain. If an attacker wants to tamper with the database, it must control most of the nodes in the network, which is very difficult in practical application scenarios [29] .
4) RESIST KEY ATTACK
The RASM should be able to resist attacks, including replay attacks, impersonation attacks and modification attacks. If the private key of a vehicle that has been used for a long time leaks, the attacker cannot pretend to be other vehicles to cheat this vehicle's user [30] .
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME: RASM A. DEFINITION OF SETS AND BASIC OPERATIONS
The notations of the RASM are defined in Table 1 . The definitions of the various collections and basic operations of the system are given below.
Definition 1: The collection of the user's identity is defined as PID = {PID AIK , PID Nonce , PID Others }. Among them, the kernel is P AIK , which represents the attestation identity key. P Nonce is a random number for anti-replay security. The collection of the node's integrated evidence is defined as N = {N 1 , N 2 , . . . , S n }, where n is the number of computing platform components. The computing platform components mainly include the trusted metric root, BIOS, OS, APP and so on. 2). Socket(P, Q) formally establishes the communications between node A and node B.
B. CORE STRUCTURE OF BLOCKCHAIN
The block is the core data structure of the block chain system. It is very complex to design a complete block chain system. This section describes the function and particularity of the RASM block. The blockchain of the RASM is essentially a decision ledger of access control, and the computing nodes involved in the computing network are identified by their AIKs. It writes its basic information to the blockchain and marks the network time and validation time. The system recognizes that the computing nodes are stored in the blockchain. The nodes have been uniformly verified by all nodes in the distributed network within the validation time, and their security state is shown to be credible. If a computing node exits the network, the node has its exit time noted and its security status is updated to untrusted. The blockchain system maintains a parameter and records the credit value of each node, which is used to mark the degree of trust of the calculated node. This value changes dynamically in the network and it increases or decreases depending on the node's performance in the network. When a node's credit value is too low, it needs to be reproved remotely. According to different consensus algorithms, the implementation form of bookkeeping nodes can be determined flexibly.
The core data structure of the block is shown in Figure 2 . Figure 3 is the detailed sequence of the proposed RASM scheme. When the computing node P joins in the network, which is defined as C = {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , . . . , C n }, it is necessary to test its credibility. If creditable, the network will be formed as C = {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , . . . , C n , P}. There are two core steps in this process: 1) P provides the evidence of the credible identity and integrity certificate to the network E; and
C. COMPUTE MODEL OF RASM
2) The computing node in E makes decisions and the accounting node summarizes the sub-conclusions, which form the final results that are written into block.
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Step 1 P: Send(Apply||AIKa, Q) The node P sends the request to the computing node Q, which is in the network.
Step 2Q: Refer(P QC , P, AIK p , P Result ) The node Q will check its legality in the Area block chain according to the attestation identity key (AIK) of node P. If P Result is legal, proceed to Step 3. If not, go to Step 4.
Step 3 Soc ker(P, Q) If the correspondence between node P and node Q is proven, the process is over.
Step 4 Pick PE (C, PE)thenQ : Send(PE, P) The accounting node is selected from the collection of nodes C. It then sends the information of mode PE to node P.
Step 5 I measure (P, PID P , N P ) Node P measures itself completely and then obtains the identity collection evidence, PID P , and the integrated collection, N P
Step 6 P: Send(PID P ||N P , PE) Node P sends the evidence of the certified identity and integrity to PE, and demands remote attestation.
Step 7 PE: Send(PID P ||N P , C) PE publishes the evidence of node P to the whole network to make the decision.
Step Each node in C verifies the identity and integrated evidence, and obtains the conclusion D ka , where a single node can check whether P can access the network or not.
After obtaining the conclusion, each node will publish it to the whole network C.
Step 9 Pick AN (C, PE ), Decision multiple (PE , D m , Access, new block ) Select a new accounting node PE . Then, PE obtains the certified conclusion of the whole network according to the analysis of the decision collection, which the whole network obtains in step 8, and produces a new block, new_block.
Step 10 Re Blckchain (PE , P QC , C, new block ). PE publishes the new block to the whole network, and updates the blockchain database P QC .
V. SECURITY EVALUATION
In this section, the security of the RASM scheme is analysed. In our experiment, we used security goals to assess whether the proposed scheme is secure and if it efficiently enhances vehicle security. In addition, it analyses the efficiency of the safety certification.
The remote attestation model RASM should guarantee the security requirement of remote certification on the basis of inheriting the blockchain's safety features. The security requirements mainly include decentralization, traceability, anonymity and non-repudiation. The analysis is based on the threat model in which the adversary can eavesdrop, acquire and tamper with the agreement message. It is a legitimate network user in essence. Although the underlying cryptographic algorithm is safe, random numbers and private keys cannot be compromised, which can be guaranteed by the TPM.
Proposition 1: The RASM scheme can realize decentralized security.
The RASM model's decentralization is reflected in two aspects.
1) Centreless gateway. In fact, the blockchain system stores the decision list of the access control in the traditional security gateway in each computing node in the form of distributed data. This distributes the security risks and reduces the possibility of the entire network being compromised.
2) Codetermination. The accounting node itself is generated by voting, and each node has the right to vote. Furthermore, the decision regarding whether an external node can access the network is also generated by all computing nodes.
Theorem 1: If the consensus mechanism is credible, the RASM is decentralized.
Attestation: Suppose the adversary MN tries to become the central node of the network E. When PICK PE (E, PE) is credible, the selection of the accounting node is random and is a trusted node with a high probability. Unless MN can control the majority of the nodes, the adversary's attack will fail, which is obviously difficult. We considering two scenarios.
Scenario 1: MN does not belong to the network E. At that time, MN should first perform remote attestation so that network E recognizes the legal identity of MN and writes it to the blockchain. If MN does not have a legal TPM or it is in an untrusted running state, the evidence obtained by step 5 is illegal, and MN fails to join the network. If MN possesses a legal TPM or is in a credible running state, it joins the network successfully and MN is only a normal node at this time.
Scenario 2: MN already belongs to network E. It is similar to scenario 1, and whether MN can become a central node has a small probability. Even if MN is an accounting node in the computing, it only occurs once. Furthermore, if MN writes content that is inconsistent with the whole network, we make the same conclusion as in step 9. Other nodes can be perceived, which will reduce the credit of MN. The credit value will make it harder to be elected as an accounting node the next time.
Thus, the RASM scheme can realize decentralized security. Proposition 2: The RASM scheme can realize Traceability secrecy.
The blockchain is a chained data structure. From the beginning of the network operations, all the behaviours that the users want to record can be recorded in the blockchain. As long as the users search along the blockchain, the users can find all the history records.
Theorem 2: If the network behaviour has been written to the blockchain, the network behaviour is traceable.
Attestation: Traceability has a double meaning. That is, the evidence written into the blockchain can be retrieved in the end, and the traceable evidence is credible and nonrepudiatable. Consider the following two typical scenarios separately.
Scenario 1:
The node C m in E is attacked, and it is determined to be a malicious node MN by the model. At this point, the computing node in network E traces the network behaviour of the node C m in the blockchain, and thus can make a security response based on the analysis.
Scenario 2: C a and C b perform secure computing. Due to certain interests, node C a vainly deletes the audit log and no longer recognizes the interactions that have occurred with C b . Since the blockchain in the RASM model can fully record the behaviours and is distributed storage, the repudiation of node P is invalid.
Proposition 3: The RASM scheme can realize Anonymity.
In the remote attestation model, anonymous authentication is the focus and is a difficulty. For an open blockchain system, privacy protection is also an important issue, and identities and data privacy in the blockchain must be guaranteed. The identity key, AIK, is used to represent the identity of the platform for authentication, which in itself is designed for trusted computing to enhance anonymity. The combination of the two can effectively guarantee the anonymity of the RASM model.
Theorem 3:
The RASM model is also anonymous if the TPM key is secure.
Attestation: Assuming that the TPM key is secure, the external entity can only obtain the certificate of the identity key AIK, and cannot obtain the endorsement key. In addition, the corresponding relationship between the platform and the TPM cannot be obtained. In the authentication scheme, for the principle based on zero-knowledge attestation, the external entity can only know the legality of its identity, but not its specific identity.
Therefore, the RASM scheme is anonymous.
Proposition 4:
The RASM scheme can realize nonrepudiatable security.
Non-repudiation is an important security feature of the blockchain. If an attacker wants to tamper with the database, it must control most of the nodes in the network, which is very difficult in practical applications.
Theorem 4: If the adversary cannot control most of the nodes in the blockchain system, the RASM scheme is nonrepudiatable.
Attestation: Assume that the adversary MN attempts to modify a block B m in the blockchain system. A blockchain is a chain structure with strong correlation. A block is slightly modified, and its hashed value changes. Therefore, all blocks behind B m must be modified. The blockchain is a distributed database system that modifies the data stored on most nodes, which is contrary to the safety assumption of the theorem.
Therefore, the RASM can realize key non-repudiation security.
Proposition 5: The RASM scheme can resist attacks Attestation: In the RASM scheme, no single access control node is available. The block chain combined with the AIK authentication mechanism can solve the identity authentication problem of automobiles, servers and RSUs in the IOV. It can also solve the user account management problem, which can realize multiple logins for the same account. In addition, the blockchain's built-in encryption can be used to encrypt the vehicular identity information to prevent user information from leaking. In general, the application of the blockchain can solve the problem of identity authentication. Thus, it can resist the security features of key attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, modification attacks and manin-the-middle attacks and be tamper-resistant.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyse the performance of RASM through extensive experiments. We conduct systematic simulations on a modern PC. The configuration is an Intel Core i7-4790 at 4.00 GHz. The operation system is Ubuntu 16.04 and the architecture is ARM64. The simulation strictly follows the model and patterns that are used by two vehicles in the actual scenario.
A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
In this paper, a real test scenario is constructed to evaluate the performance of the proposed security model. There are four test experiments of the RASM, and the platform is shown in Figure 4 . Our platform is mainly used in the laboratory teaching and the experiment. Each one may move in under 100 square meters and many vehicles can move in above 200 square meters. The platform can be applied to scientific and technological innovation and application tests of large exhibition halls, freight yards and distribution centres.We set over 200 vehicles nodes and 20 RSUs, as shown in Figure 5 . We choose enough venues for experiments. 
B. ANALYSIS OF REAL MESSAGES EXECUTION
In Table 2 , the results of the successfully executed messages re shown. We test 4 real vehicles, as shown in Figure 4 . Each vehicle was tested for one month and worked six hours a day. As showed in Table 2 , 1037 total successful messages were signed, among which 1004 are successfully executed, which achieved a success rate of approximately 97.09%. The confirmation time for each successful message is approximately 3 seconds on average. The main reason for unsuccessful messages is an insufficient delay for the vehicles. 
C. ANALYSIS OF COMPUTATIONAL COST FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
The execution times of the proposed cryptographic operations were calculated using Ciphertext-Policy AttributeBased Encryption [31] . The cpabe toolkit provides a set of programmes that can implement a ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption scheme. In the RASM scheme, the cpabakeygeneration, the cpaba-encryption and cpaba-decryption operations take most of the time.
The average lengths of encryption, key generation and decryption in Figure 3 are respectively 0.62 ms, 0.53 ms and 1.1 ms. Given that the key generation in Figure 3 is performed according to the trusted process in the authentication policy, this step can be categorized into the verifying server initialization effort. The time it consumes is not counted in the certification process, and thus, the RASM authentication scheme takes a total of 2.11 ms. For a clearer description of the performance of the RASM based authentication scheme, in Figure 5 , for the simulation, it enabled the execution of an x2-based interface that was configured between the vehicles and the RSUs. The values of the simulation parameters are presented in Table 3 .
The RASM scheme tested the performance of the authentication using 500-1000 and 1000-5000 attributes. The time delays shown in Figures 6 and Figure 7 are obtained. As shown in Figures 6 and Figure 7 , the decryption operation will take longer than the other two operations when there are approximately 2800 attributes. As the number of attributes increases, the decryption operation will take increasingly more time. However, for some special vehicular networking scenarios, such as the classified networks, the effects of long 
FIGURE 6.
The RASM scheme tested the performance of the authentication using 500-1000 attributes.
FIGURE 7.
The RASM scheme tested the performance of the authentication using 1000-5000 attributes.
waiting times on the accuracy and security of platform information is tolerable. Figure 8 presents the variations in the message delays with the number of the vehicles, where the yellow curve with the circle denotes Lee and Lai's scheme [22] , the orange curve with the triangle denotes Jianhong et al.'s scheme [23] , the green curve with the circle denotes Bayat et al.'s scheme [24] , the blue curve with the star denotes He et al.'s scheme [25] , the black curve with the triangle denotes Xu et al.'s scheme [26] , and the red curve with the circle denotes the presented RASM. It presents a comparison of the message delays with the number of vehicles, wherein the presented scheme exhibited an obvious advantage compared to Lee's, Zhang's and Bayat's schemes. The RASM also exhibited a high vehicle density advantage compared He's and Xu's scheme. In addition, the RASM provided robust privacy preservation, including decentralization, traceability, anonymity, and non-repudiation.
D. ANALYSIS OF MESSAGE DELAYS

VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a remote attestation security model based on the privacy-preserving blockchain in the V2X, called the RASM, has been proposed. This scheme involves two core steps. The first is credible identity authentication. The second uses calculation nodes to make decisions and accounting nodes to write the data blocks. The model framework, block chain core structure and protocol process are described in detail. Meanwhile, experiments have been done using a real network scenario to evaluate the performance of the RASM. The results show that a 97.09% success rate can be achieved for the scheme. These simulation results demonstrate that our scheme can effectively enhance the privacy-preserving security of intelligent vehicles in the V2X.
